Hospital rate review. A theory and an empirical review.
This paper presents a theory of the effects of rate review on hospital operations and organization. Its purpose is to explain the way in which hospitals have responded to regulation. In the development of this theory, the hospital product was viewed as a bundle of services, rate review was looked upon as a ceiling on the value of the bundle. The ceiling creates an incentive to remove elements from the bundle, i.e., to reduce 'quality'. When quality is variable, the effect on utilization becomes indeterminate. The model argues, among other things, that the hospital will change its service complement and its contractural arrangements with physicians and other hospitals. An extension of the organizational theory literature leads to implications concerning the ordering of hospital responses to regulation. The growing body of empirical literature on the effects of hospital rate review is used as an initial test of the major thrusts of the theory. A suggested agenda for further empirical work also is presented.